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Introduction
It should be indisputable that formulation of term “soft power” was one of 
the breakthrough moments in the history of political science and international 
relations  As a result, the description of the global order after the end of the Cold 
War has become more comprehensive at several levels and thus much closer 
to reality  The phrase was used for the first time in the 1980s by the American 
political scientist, Joseph Nye, as a response to the serious limitations of classical 
realism, one of the leading theoretical perspectives of international relations in 
that period  In the analysis of political processes, representatives of the realistic 
approach focused their attention primarily on studying the military capabilities 
and ways of exerting economic pressure of individual states in order to build 
a prominent position in the international system  However, along with dynami-
cally accelerating globalization, which had an integrating effect on the actions of 
states in the international arena, the model for explaining complex mechanisms 
by referring only to geostrategic and economic factors has become insufficient1  
Accordingly, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power, which in its basic 
version implied the state's ability to implement its policy through non-forceful 
1  J  Nye, Soft Power, “Foreign Policy”, 1990, no  80, pp  167–170 
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measures  The key factor in this approach is that other participants of the in-
ternational system respect the values and culture of a given country, and aspire 
to achieve a similar level of political, economic or social development  Over the 
years, the definition of "soft power" has been refined with further elements and 
dimensions, but in a general sense this term is associated with the capacity to 
positively influence others2 
The main objective of this article is an attempt to answer the research ques-
tion regarding the role of the Balkans in contemporary Turkish politics  Since 
the Justice and Development Party (tur  Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) 
won parliamentary elections in November 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy has 
been conducted under the framework of the doctrine of "strategic depth"  In 
the opinions of the AKP politicians, one of the main tasks of Turkish diplomacy 
is to regain influence within the boundaries of former Ottoman Empire  From 
this perspective, Turkey’s unique geographical location, imperial legacy, and 
cultural richness creates favorable conditions for such political expansion  In 
the first part of this text, a brief historical overview of Turkish-Balkan relations 
is presented to shed some light on origins of Turkey’s current engagement in 
the region  Subsequently, the concept of Turkish soft power is characterized in 
reference to both Joseph Nye’s theoretical assumptions, as well as the political 
practise of the AKP government  The third part of the article introduces gov-
ernment institutions and agencies whose aim is to promote Turkey among the 
Balkan countries  As part of this paper, special attention has been given to three 
of these: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (tur  Türk İşbirliği ve 
Koordinasyon Ajansı – TİKA), Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Com-
munities (tur  Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı – YTB), the 
Yunus Emre Institute (tur  Yunus Emre Enstitüsü – YEE)  An analysis of selected 
activities of the above-mentioned organizations was a key part of this research  
In regard to previous findings, this article concludes with an assessment of 
Turkish cooperation initiatives in the Balkans and attempts to determine the 
future direction of AKP government’s involvement in the region 
Within this paper three research hypotheses were formulated:
H₁ – Republic of Turkey's cultural initiatives in the Balkans are perceived as 
a substantial development opportunity by both Muslim and non-Muslim states; 
2  W  Lewandowski, Soft Power jako narzędzie geopolityki. Znaczenie kultury popularnej, 
[in:] Polityka zagraniczna państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej na przełomie XX i XXI wieku: 
Ujęcie geopolityczne, ed  J  Tymanowski, Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW, War-
szawa 2005, pp  61–65 
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H₂ – creation of an effective mechanism for coordinating the activities of 
various organizations and agencies has significantly facilitated the projection of 
Turkish soft power in the Balkans;
H₃ – the protracted internal crisis within the European Union may increase 
Turkey's chances to gain a dominant position in the Balkans 
The theoretical structure of this text is based on the image theory in inter-
national relations that originates from Kalevi Holsti’s international roles theory  
According to its basic assumptions, image theory examines the foreign policies 
of individual states in relation to the images created by politicians  Similarly, 
political perceptions are often shaped by social mood and preferences of the 
voters3  Due to the fact that these two elements are in constant relationship, it is 
possible to draw conclusions about determinants and directions of the diplomatic 
activities of a given state  One method by which this research objective can be 
achieved is an analysis of factors shaping political discourse4 
The principal question of image theory concerns the essence of components 
constructing perception  As explained by Kenneth Boulding, the key factor af-
fecting the image is message, i e  the official statements of decision-makers  Any 
activity of a state in the international arena can be employed as a useful tool to 
create positive image that, in turn, can lead into an increase of its regional posi-
tion5  On the other hand, the external perception, i e  the international system, 
the opinions of other participants and stereotypes of a given state, influence the 
general image as well  Consequently, external images are fundamental sources 
of information for politicians, since on their basis specific policies are created 
or designed to strengthen the legitimacy of their originators (an issue of effec-
tiveness)  Moreover, images also determine the entire scope of activity of a given 
state in the international system, defining its capabilities and limitations with 
respect to other participants6  In the context of political practise, the media 
plays an important role, as it ensures communication between the elites through 
public opinion  Therefore, from the decision-makers’ perspective, the proper 
reception of images and perceptions can considerably facilitate the process of 
3  M  G  Alexander, S  Levin, P  Henry, Image theory, social identity, and social dominance: 
Structural characteristics and individual motives underlying international images, “Political Psy-
chology”, 2005, no  26 (1), pp  27–45 
4  R  K  Herrmann, J  F  Voss, T  Schooler, J  Ciarrochi, Images in International Relations: 
An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata, “International Studies Quarterly”, 1997, no  3 (41), 
pp  405–414 
5  K  Boulding, “National Images and International Systems, ”Conflict Resolution Quarter-
ly”, 1959, no  3 (2), p  10 
6  A  Niemann, Ch  Bretherton, EU external policy at the crossroads: The challenge of actor-
ness and effectiveness, ”International Relations”, 2013, no  3 (27), p  265 
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pursuing policies that are widely accepted by society7  Among researchers who 
substantially contributed to the development of image theory in international 
relations, the following names should be mentioned: Michele G  Alexander, 
Natalia Chaban, Richard K  Herrmann, Robert Jervis, Tuuli-Marja Kleiner, So-
nia Lucarelli, Xiuli Wang  Considering that international affairs literature has 
put the main emphasis on describing roles and images of the European Union 
and United States of America, this research paper seeks to test assumptions of 
image theory on the example of the Republic of Turkey and its relations with 
the Balkan states 
In order to identify the most significant initiatives and decisions related to 
Turkey's policy towards the Balkans in the context of political and cultural coop-
eration, a wide range of original Turkish sources (academic publications, public 
reports, policy briefs, etc ) have been studied  Detailed analysis of interviews 
and official statements of prominent Turkish politicians is also a crucial part of 
the paper  The source analysis focuses on determining the impact of the Turk-
ish-Balkans relations on Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy  In accordance 
with above-mentioned explanations, this research is based on a qualitative re-
search methodology  Due to the key role of written materials in this study, source 
criticism was chosen as the primal research method  In the case of presidential 
and governmental documentation, political discourse analysis was employed  
Moreover, the process of modifying Turkey's strategy towards the Balkan states 
was examined by historical method, foreign policy analysis, process tracking 
method and comparative analysis8  
Historical background
The Balkan Peninsula has been an area of Turkish expansion almost from the 
very establishment of the Ottoman state that was founded in western Anatolia 
at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries by Osman Gazi  In 1352, the army led 
by Sultan Orhan, the son of Osman, defeated the combined Serbian-Bulgarian 
forces near Demotika in Thrace, which resulted in the capture of first lodge-
ments on European soil by the Turks9  Two years later, troops commanded by 
Süleyman Pasha conquered the strategically important city of Gallipoli, which 
7  S  Lucarelli, Seen from the Outside: The State of the Art on the External Image of the EU, 
”Journal of European Integration”, 2013, no  1 (36), pp  10–14 
8  A  Klotz, D  Prakash, Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008, pp  75–116 
9  S  J  Shaw, Historia Imperium Osmańskiego i  Republiki Tureckiej. Tom I  (1280–1808), 
Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, Warszawa 2012, p  43 
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lies at the mouth of the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmara  As a consequence of 
this conquest, the Ottoman Turks strengthened their position on the European 
shore of the strait, from where they regularly attacked lands in the interior of 
the Balkan Peninsula  Taking advantage of their military power, by the end of 
fourteenth century, the Ottomans seized the Christian principalities of Serbia 
and Bulgaria, as well as Wallachia and the territories of present-day Albania and 
Macedonia10  Simultaneously, the Ottoman Turks also gradually took over the 
domains belonging previously to the Byzantine Empire  The culmination point 
of this process was the siege of Constantinople, which finally collapsed under 
Turkish pressure on 29 May 145311  After this triumph, the imperial period of 
the Ottoman state began  Over the next century and a half, the sultanate sys-
tematically expanded its borders, becoming one of the most powerful empires of 
medieval Europe  In the following decades after the capture of Constantinople, 
the Turks conquered nearly the entire Balkan Peninsula and most of the islands 
on the surrounding seas12  
However, at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries the slow decline of 
the Ottoman Empire ensued, which was reflected in its territorial losses  The 
reasons for this situation include weakening of the sultan's power, as a result of 
which governors of several provinces gained broad independence, and the lack 
of necessary internal reforms, on the basis of which the inefficient socio-polit-
ical system of the Empire could have been transformed13  Although the Balkan 
Peninsula was one of the regions in which the Ottoman Turks maintained strong 
influence for a relatively long time, eventually, aspirations for independence 
emerged there as well  
The rise of nationalism in Europe at that time was a consequence of social 
changes initiated by events related to the French Revolution  After a series of 
rebellions and anti-Turkish uprisings that occurred in the Balkans in the first 
half of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire lost Greece and was forced to 
grant autonomy to the Serbs  In the aftermath of further defeats on the Balkan 
front, the unconditional independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, 
as well as the autonomy of Bulgaria were recognized by the Treaty of Berlin in 
10  N  Çelik, Black Sea and the Balkans under Ottoman Rule, “Karadeniz Araştırmaları”, 
2010, no  6 (24), pp  11–18 
11  F  Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
1992, pp  88–93 
12  İ  Bostan, Fatih Sultan Mehmed ve Osmanlı Denizciliği, [in:] Türk Denizcilik Tarihi (I), 
eds  İ  Bostan, S  Özbaran, Deniz Basımevi Müdürlüğü, İstanbul 2009, pp  86–94 
13  B  Kodaman, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Çağdaşlaşma Sorunları, “Selçuk Üniversitesi 
Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi”, 2005, no  18, pp  151–152 
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187814  Three decades later, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, which only increased the already high level of tensions in the region  The 
Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 had unfavourable outcome for the Turks, who 
struggled to maintain their possessions in the Balkans  The weakened empire 
was no longer able to successfully defend its borders, losing its last lands on the 
Balkan Peninsula (Macedonia, Albania and Thrace)15  Ultimately, the Ottoman 
Empire fell apart as a result of the defeat of the Central Powers (Germany and 
Austria-Hungary) during the First World War  The victorious Allied (Entente) 
powers (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) then divided the sultanate into 
several semi-sovereign states and zones of influence, granting the Turks only the 
central part of Anatolia  As a consequence, the Turkish War of Independence 
broke out in 1919, leading to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in October 
1923  According to the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed 
by Turkish authorities in the same year, Turkey received a small portion of land 
in the south-eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula (East Thrace), representing 
only 3 percent of the total area of the country  However, the remnant of the 
former splendor of the Ottoman Empire is the Turkish minority that, although 
its population is gradually decreasing, lives in most Balkan states to the present 
day16  This is the basic factor favoring the implementation of Turkish soft power 
in this region 
The conception of Turkish soft power
According to the original idea of Joseph Nye, there are three main sources of 
soft power: culture, political values  and foreign policy  As explained by the author 
of this scheme, the cultural factor consists of two components: high culture (e g  
literature, education system, technological advancement) and popular culture 
(e g  music, cinematography, television programs)  Each of the above-mentioned 
aspects enables the shaping of the perception of recipients, which in turn affects 
the creation of an attractive image with regard to the source state on a regional 
14  M  Karabulut, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 19. Yüzyılda Deği̇şi̇m Süreci̇, Sosyal Ve 
Kültürel Durum, “Mecmua Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi”, 2016, no  1 (2), p  64 
15  S  Yıldırım, Balkan Savaşları ve Sonrasındaki Göçlerin Türkiye Nüfusuna Etkileri, “Cum-
huriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi”, 2012, no  8 (16), pp  78–79 
16  C  Sancaktar, Balkanlar’da Türk ve Müslüman Milletler: 19. Yüzyıldan Günümüze 
Milliyetçiliğe Karşı Varoluş Mücadelesi, “Balkan ve Yakın Doğu Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi”, 2019, 
no  1 (5), pp  13–18 
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or global stage17  Another source of soft power is derived from political values  
These are the most important link in the whole conception  In this context, a state 
should establish a fixed set of rules and norms by which it would be able to pres-
ent its national interests in a positive way, thus encouraging other participants 
of the international system to voluntarily adopt their values  This is connected 
with Joseph Nye’s assumption according to which the actual strength of the state 
is demonstrated by the popularity of its ideological system  
Political values remain in close relation to the last source of soft power, 
which is foreign policy18  The convergence of standards at the ideological level 
with specific activities in the international arena significantly facilitates the 
implementation of diplomatic goals  Due to the huge impact of foreign policy 
on determining the international status of a state, soft power is also reliant on 
central authorities acting appropriately  In his conception, Joseph Nye gave 
priority to political values based on culture, whereas foreign policy serves as 
a tool for transmission and execution of state intentions in the global sphere19 
Several scientific bodies have conducted professional research on the role 
of soft power in contemporary international relations  Among these one should 
mention the USC Center on Public Diplomacy  This entity publishes an annual 
ranking of thirty countries that employ their soft power most effectively  The 
“Soft Power 30 Index” includes factors such as technological advancement, in-
novativeness of enterprises, standards of education, cultural wealth and quality 
of governance  In recent years, Turkey has advanced three times into this group 
– in 2015, it ranked 28th, two years later 30th and last year 29th20  The latest 
editions of the ranking are dominated by European countries, especially Great 
Britain, France and Germany21 
Since the Justice and Development Party (tur  Adalet ve Kalkınma Parti̇si 
– AKP) won parliamentary elections in November 2002, the new Turkish gov-
ernment has recognised soft power as a key element in its political strategy  In 
this context, the main objective of AKP’s foreign policy is a gradual regaining of 
influence in regions that had once were within the boundaries of the Ottoman 
17  C  Özel, Yumuşak Güce Bütünsel Bakış, "Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi”, 2018, no  1 (7), 
pp  7–8 
18  L  Lin, L  Hongtao, Joseph Nye’s Soft Power Theory and Its Revelation Towards Ideological 
and Political Education, ”Humanities and Social Sciences”, 2017, no  2 (5), pp  70–71 
19  U  Yapıcı, Yumuşak Güç Ölçülebilir mi?, ”Uluslararası İlişkiler”, 2015, no  12 (47), pp  10–11 
20  USC Center on Public Diplomacy, https://softpower30 com/country/turkey/, “Turkey – 
Soft Power 30”, accessed in: 18 01 2020  
21  J  McClory, The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2018, “USC Center on 
Public Diplomacy”, https://softpower30 com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-Soft-Power-30-
Report-2018 pdf, 2018, accessed in: 18 01 2020 
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Empire  By properly understanding the changing dynamics of international 
processes on the threshold of the 21st century, the AKP government led by 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has developed a comprehensive diplomatic action plan 
based on the mechanisms of positive impact within Turkey’s near abroad  Dur-
ing the conceptualization of Turkish foreign policy doctrine of the AKP era, 
the authorities employed assumptions of the “strategic depth” conception  This 
concept was brought to light in 2001, by Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu22  Ac-
cordingly, the Republic of Turkey’s primal goal is to strive to stabilize the tense 
situation in neighboring regions by utilizing the entire catalogue of measures 
and tools related to Joseph Nye’s soft power theory  Consequently, the Turkish 
government focused on issues relevant and important for improving the level of 
security in this part of the world  Among the specific tasks of AKP diplomacy, 
the following examples should be mentioned: promoting the Turkish model of 
Muslim democracy, assuming the role of mediator in regional conflicts, engag-
ing in activities of international organizations, and offering social and cultural 
support to the countries concerned23  The ultimate effect of this strategy was 
supposed to be that Turkey would obtain the status of a regional leader, which 
would allow remodeling the international order and limiting the global domi-
nance of the United States and the European Union  Ahmet Davutoğlu himself 
supervised the proper execution of the AKP foreign policy doctrine, first as an 
adviser to Prime Minister Erdoğan (2003–2009), then the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (2009–2014), and finally the head of government (2014–2016)24 
Despite initial successes in implementing the vision of "strategic depth", 
over time, it became apparent that many essential components of the doctrine 
had been based on too idealistic premises  The attempt to maintain positive 
relations with all states in the region turned out to be particularly damaging to 
Turkey's image, as a result of which many allies have lost confidence in Turkish 
diplomacy  Seeking to overcome this unfavourable trend, Turkish government 
opted for more explicit rhetoric, concentrating on cooperation with Sunni organ-
izations whose worldview coincided with the AKP’s ideology  However, the shift 
in foreign policy had the opposite effect to what was intended, which resulted 
22  C  Saraçoğlu, AKP, Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika: Bir Milliyetçilik Doktrini Olarak Stratejik 
Derinlik, “Alternatif Politika”, 2013, no  1 (5), pp  57–59 
23  Y  Avcı, Türk Dış Politikasının Stratejik Derinlik Revizyonunda Balkanlar, “BEU İzdüşüm 
Dergisi”, 2017, no  2 (2), pp  106–110 
24  B  H  Tarcan, H  Akgüller, K  Işık, Ahmet Davutoğlu Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası, “Econder 
Uluslararası Akademik Dergi”, 2018, no  2 (2), pp  252–257 
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in Turkey's diplomatic defeat during the Arab Spring25  Due to the failure of 
his vision, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu resigned in May 2016  Since then, 
Turkish regional strategy has been significantly modified, eventually adopting 
a more pragmatic shape  As a consequence of these corrections and rearrange-
ments, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the main decision-making 
center determining the direction of Turkey's future international involvement  
Nevertheless, soft power remained a substantial factor in the plans for Turkish 
political expansion in the region  
Turkey’s soft power is based on culture, history, and geography26  From An-
kara’s perspective, the imperial heritage of modern Turkey unites all regions that 
were once ruled by the Ottoman sultans, which enables a reference to shared 
experiences and the possibility to build multi-level cooperation  In the geopo-
litical narrative of the Justice and Development Party, Turkey is considered as 
a core state in new regional system because of its statehood tradition, political 
values, and unique model of Islamic democracy  As explained by the AKP gov-
ernment, public diplomacy has been a pillar of Turkey’s soft power for almost 
two decades, which significantly facilitates incorporation of Turkish patterns by 
international community27 
Turkey’s public diplomacy activities in the Balkans
In accordance with the AKP regional strategy, public diplomacy activities 
are conducted within two main frameworks: governmental and civic (i e  spe-
cialised agencies, non-governmental organizations, research centres, media)  
During its nearly twenty years in power, the Justice and Development Party 
has substantially expanded and strengthened the institutional system of public 
diplomacy  Among organizations whose task is to promote Turkish soft power 
at home and abroad the following ones should be noted: Turkish Cooperation 
and Coordination Agency (tur  Türkiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı – TİKA), 
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (tur  Yurtdışı Türkler 
ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı – YTB), Investment Support and Promotion 
25  G  Tüysüzoğlu, Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası: Yeni Osmanlıcılık ve Türk Avra-
syacılığı Ekseninde İnşa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm, “Alternatif Politika”, 2013, no  3 (5), pp  309–311 
26  B  Süsler, Turkey: An Emerging Middle Power in a Changing World?, “LSE Ideas: Strate-
gic Update”, http://www lse ac uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-Turkey-Mid-
dle-Power pdf, 2019, accessed in: 19 01 2020 
27  U  Ünal, Ülke Markalamasi Üzeri̇nden Kamu Di̇plomasi̇si̇ Ve Türki̇ye Anali̇zi̇, “Türk 
Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları”, http://www tasam org/Files/Icerik/File/TASAM_
MAKALE_pdf_6a434e5f-0571-4f33-9fc2-e63207aa9938 pdf, 2017, accessed in: 19 01 2020 
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Agency of Turkey (ISPAT), the Yunus Emre Institute (tur  Yunus Emre Enstitüsü – 
YEE), Turkish Radio and Television (tur  Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyonu – TRT)28  
Thus, the originators of the Turkish version of soft power almost directly related 
its assumptions to the classic paradigm developed by Joseph Nye, constructing 
their conception on a complementary triad of culture, political values, and 
foreign policy  
An analysis of Turkey’s worldwide activities indicates that a distinguishing 
feature of the Turkish cooperation model is its exceptional focus on the cultural 
aspect  As has already been mentioned, Turkish soft power reached its peak at 
the end of the first decade of the 21st century when the Republic of Turkey could 
indeed be considered a regional leader  However, subsequent events connected 
with its tense internal situation and increasingly confrontational foreign policy 
has led to a noticeable deterioration in Turkey's international image29 
In the regional strategy of the Justice and Development Party, the Balkan 
Peninsula was a key area for potential political expansion  Turkey had strong 
historical and cultural, as well as (to a lesser extent) social and economic ties 
with the countries in this region  Moreover, as held by Turkish foreign policy 
makers, at the beginning of the 21st century no world power is in control of the 
Balkans  Under these circumstances, the AKP began practical implementation 
of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision within the Balkan Peninsula  Taking advantage of 
the geopolitical void that resulted from the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Turkish 
government aimed at improving the level of security and stability in the region30 
  Initially, due to active diplomacy and significant financial support, An-
kara managed to develop positive relations with countries inhabited by both 
Muslims (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Christians (Serbia, Macedo-
nia)  However, Turkey's growing involvement in the Balkans, also manifested in 
ambitions for expanding political influence, has led to the emergence of accusa-
tions of Turkish imperialism  As a result, some Balkan states have limited their 
participation in the AKP initiatives, criticizing Turkish diplomacy’s excessive 
emphasis on the Ottoman past of the region  Representatives of the Justice and 
28  E  Eren, Sivil Toplumun Dış Politika İnşasındaki Rolü: Türk Kamu Diplomasisi Örneği, 
“Ekonomi, Politika & Finans Araştırmaları Dergisi”, 2017, no  1 (2), pp  41–42 
29  S  M  Torelli, The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model for the Middle East, [in:] Turkey’s Re-
lations with the Middle East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring, eds  H  Işıksal, O  Göksel, 
Springer, New York 2018, pp  59–61 
30  Y  Avcı, op. cit., pp  110–113 
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Development Party reject these allegations, and point out the entire catalogue of 
benefits resulting from in-depth cooperation between Turkey and the Balkans31 
In the early period of the AKP's rule, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served then 
as special adviser to Prime Minister Erdoğan, was a frequent visitor in the Bal-
kan states  During his diplomatic visits, Professor Davutoğlu presented a plan 
for multilateral cooperation that included intensive contacts at governmental, 
business and social levels  The ultimate goal of these actions was to purportedly 
raise the standards of living in the region and ensure stable economic growth 
for all Balkan countries32  
Despite submitting an attractive political offer, the Turkish proposal was 
not received positively since the authorities of the Balkan states chose instead 
to integrate with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion  Furthermore, the Russian Federation also began to gain more influence in 
the region during this period  In competition with such powerful rivals, Turkey 
was doomed to failure  As a result, the AKP withdrew from pursuing its polit-
ical interests in the Balkan Peninsula, shifting attention to the Middle East and 
North Africa  Thus, for more than a decade now, Turkish foreign policy towards 
the Balkans has been based primarily on the socio-cultural dimension, which is 
appreciated particularly by the Muslim community  Development of economic 
partnership is another important aspect of Turkish activity in the region33  
The next subsections will introduce the most notable organizations which 
are ensuring the projection of Turkish soft power in the Balkans 
1. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency 
Among Turkish government institutions and organizations that are currently 
operating in the Balkans, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency 
(TİKA) plays the key role  TİKA was founded in 1992 and its initial task was to 
strengthen the ties connecting Turkey with Turkic states established after the 
dissolution of the USSR (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan)  In this context, the agency has developed a number of projects and 
31  A  N  Yılmaz, G  Kılıçoğlu, Balkanlar’da YTB Ve TİKA’nin Türk Kamu Di̇plomasi̇si̇ Ku-
rumları Olarak Faali ̇yetleri̇ Ve Türki̇ye’ni ̇n Bölgedeki̇ Yumuşak Gücüne Etki̇leri̇, “Finans Ekonomi 
ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi”, 2017, no  2 (2), pp  118–119 
32  Y  Avcı, op. cit., pp  112–115 
33  G  Telatar, Ak Parti'nin Düzen Kurucu Dış Politika Söylemi Ve Ortadoğu, “Alternatif Poli-
tika”, 2015, no  3 (7), pp  496–497 
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initiatives seeking to demonstrate the cultural unity of the Turkic world34  In the 
following years, TİKA's scope of activity has been expanded to other regions of 
Turkish interest  However, during the rule of the Justice and Development Party 
the agency's structure was reorganized, as a result of which TİKA has became 
the basic tool for implementing Turkish soft power in the international arena  
Currently, offices of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency are 
located in fifty-nine countries on five continents (Europe, Asia, Africa, North 
America, South America)  The agency itself coordinates or co-funds several 
thousand projects in various areas35 
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has been present within 
the Balkan Peninsula since the late 1990s and provides there a vast catalogue of 
activities, including health service, administrative assistance, education support, 
cultural cooperation and restoration of historical legacy  Recently, the last of the 
aforementioned initiatives has been in particular intensively developed  Every 
year, approximately 2 percent of the agency's total budget (which amounted to 
around 4 billion USD in 2018) is allocated exclusively to renovation of Ottoman 
heritage in the Balkan states36  According to representatives of TİKA’s manage-
ment, each project has been conducted in agreement with local authorities, 
which brings tangible benefits to both parties concerned  Indeed, reconstruction 
of historical monuments has had a positive impact on the tourism sector in the 
Balkans, which in turn has brought improvements in the general well-being and 
prosperity of local society  From the Justice and Development Party’s perspec-
tive, the socio-cultural presence in the region bolsters Turkish soft power37  As 
evidenced by published reports, between 2008 and 2016, TİKA has restored 
forty-seven historical buildings including mosques, castles, palaces, madrasas, 
places of worship, fountains and baths  Moreover, renovation works continue for 
more than twenty projects, while almost forty others are in preparatory phase38 
Among Ottoman monuments that has been restored by TİKA in the Balkans, 
the following projects (completed and ongoing) are worth mentioning:
34  E  Poyraz, M  Dinçer, Küreselleşen Dünyada Türki̇ye’ni̇n Kamu Di̇plomasi̇si̇ Faali̇yetleri̇, 
“Intermedia International e-Journal”, 2016, no  1 (3), p  43 
35  Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, https://www tika gov tr/tr, “Kurumsal”, 
accessed in: 21 01 2020 
36  Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, https://www tika gov tr/upload/2019/
Faaliyet%20Raporu%202018/TikaFaaliyetWeb pdf, “Faaliyet Raporu 2018”, 2019, accessed in: 
21 01 2020 
37  A  N  Yılmaz, G  Kılıçoğlu, op. cit., pp  122–127 
38  Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, https://www tika gov tr/upload/2018/BAL-
KANLAR/ikinci_balkan_bulusmasi_kitap pdf, “Balkanlar – TİKA”, 2018, accessed in: 21 01 2020 
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– Albania: Ethem Bey Mosque in Tirana, Old Madrasa in Vlorë, Ottoman 
Fortress in Gjirokastër;
– Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, Kovači Muslim 
Cemetery in Sarajevo, Ottoman Bridges in Mostar, Konjic and Visegrad; 
– Bulgaria: Banya Bashi Mosque in Sofia, Mirza Said Pasha Mosque in Ruse;
– Kosovo: Carshia Mosque in Pristina, Sultan Mehmet Mosque in Prizren, 
Gazi Ali Bey Hamam in Vučitrn;
– North Macedonia: Mustafa Pasha Mosque in Skopje, Military School in 
Bitola, Harabati Baba Tekke in Tetovo;
– Montenegro: Osmangic Mosque in Podgorica, Huseyn Pasha Mosque in 
Pljevlja, Clock Tower in Podgorica;
– Serbia: Tomb of Damat Ali Pasha in Belgrade, Valide Sultan Mosque in 
Sjenica, Ottoman Fortress in Ram 
It should be also noted that with regard to some of the renovation projects 
presented above, TİKA is the only institution involved in conservation works, 
while in the case of others, the agency acts as one of several organizations coordi-
nating the restoration process  In order to eventually reject recurrent allegations 
of applying Turkey’s imperial ideology in the Balkans, TİKA is also renovating 
several Christian monuments  A great example of this fact is financial support 
for the restoration of Sacred Heart of Jesus Roman Catholic Cathedral in Sara-
jevo and St  George Orthodox Church in Kumanovo (North Macedonia)  The 
only country in the region that has not been participating in cultural projects 
coordinated by TİKA is Greece, which results from historical enmities between 
Athens and Ankara  Although approximately four thousand structures built 
during the Ottoman Empire reign have remained in Greece until today, the 
Greek authorities refuse to include them into Turkish renovation program39 
2. Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
Another Turkish government organization involved in the Balkans is Pres-
idency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (tur  YTB)  This institution 
was founded in 2010 and has been attached directly to the Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey  Compared to Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, its range of activity is noticeably narrower as the main 
task of YTB is to coordinate various types of programs dedicated to Turks liv-
39  İ  Özgürlüğü, AB üyesi Yunanistan’ın başkenti Atina’da cami inşası yıllardır sürünceme-
de, “Batı Raporu”, https://batiraporu com/inanc-ozgurlugu/ab-uyesi-yunanistanin-baskenti-ati-
nada-cami-insasi-yillardir-suruncemede/, 2017, accessed in: 21 01 2020 
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ing abroad, as well as to liaison with representatives of the so-called related 
communities (i e  Turkic ethnic groups)  One of the basic reasons for creation 
of Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities was AKP’s intention 
to fully utilize the potential of the Turkish diaspora (broadly defined) around 
the world  Thus, the government decided to establish an institutional structure 
that is based on shared historical memory and cultural ties40  
The Balkan Peninsula is one of regions where YTB has been operating most 
dynamically  The institution provides in the region cultural exchange and edu-
cational programs for students  In addition, it organizes conferences, symposia 
and seminaries that are aimed at building friendly relations between Turkey and 
the Balkan nation-states  According to data published by YTB, the organization’s 
involvement in the region has been steadily increasing year by year, especially 
in countries with a large Turkish population41  
The implementation of the socio-cultural aspect of Turkish soft power has 
been conducted through a plethora of programs and projects managed by Pres-
idency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities  For instance, as part of the 
“Evliya Çelebi Youth Bridges Program”, hundreds of children and adolescents 
of Turkish origin have had an opportunity to visit the land of their ancestors  
Moreover, in 2016 YTB has launched the “Balkan Youth School Project” during 
which students from eight Balkan countries learn about Turkish culture, art, and 
history  A similar objective inspired the foundation of the “Idea Art Workshop 
Activities in the Balkans Program” which was organized a year earlier  In addi-
tion, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities cooperates with 
a number of local public benefit organizations, creating favourable conditions 
for improving the level of teaching and education in the Balkans42  
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities is also involved in 
analytical activities  In 2015, together with the Foundation for Political, Econom-
ic and Social Research (tur  Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı – 
SETA), YTB organized a conference in Ankara that was attended by members of 
think tanks from several Balkan countries (Albania, Serbia, Greece, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Croatia)  The purpose of this meeting 
was to establish a platform for public debate on the most serious problems and 
40  K  E  Yıldırım, A  Yıldırım, Türkiye'nin Yumuşak Güç Sembollerinden Türk İşbirliği Koor-
di̇nasyon Ajansi ve Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlıği’na Genel Bakış, “Karadeniz 
Uluslararası Bilimsel Dergi”, 2017, no  33 (33), p  209 
41  Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, https://www ytb gov tr/kurumsal/
stratejik-plan, “Stratejik Planı”, 2019, accessed in: 23 01 2020 
42  A  N  Yılmaz, G  Kılıçoğlu, op. cit., pp  119–122 
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challenges that the region is facing in recent times43  A few months later, the 
“Balkan Think Tank Workshop” in Kosovo took place  In this, delegates from 
leading scientific centres from Turkey and the Balkans debated the possible 
ways of strengthening and developing mutual cooperation in areas such as: the 
economy, culture, science, society, etc 44 
Another dimension of Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Commu-
nities’ engagement in the Balkans is diplomatic activity  As part of the “Foreign 
Ministry Diplomatic Academy Program”, YTB offers professional courses and 
internships at Turkish embassies and consulates in the Muslim-majority Bal-
kan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo)  The representatives 
of the organization also remain in constant dialogue with diplomats from the 
aforementioned states, the purpose of which is to strengthen bilateral relations 
and to ensure formation of a coordinated response mechanism in the case of 
unforeseen events  Thus, YTB has been slowly becoming an institution that, by 
effectively coordinating a wide range of programs and projects to deepen the 
Turkish-Balkan partnership, in the future may contribute to increasing Turkey’s 
political influence in the Muslim part of the Balkan Peninsula45 
3. Yunus Emre Institute
The last institution to be presented as part of this research is the Yunus Emre 
Institute (tur  YEE)  Established in 2009 by the AKP government as a special-
ized unit of the Yunus Emre Foundation, the institute aims to promote Turkish 
history, culture, art and language  YEE has been performing its tasks through 
Turkish cultural centres located in approximately forty countries on five conti-
nents (Europe, Asia, Africa, North America and Australia)  The most important 
activities offered by the institute include: Turkish language courses, organization 
of cultural events and art exhibitions, as well as supporting scientific research46 
As in the case of TİKA and YTB, the region to which the Yunus Emre Institute 
pays special attention is the Balkan Peninsula  In accordance with the decisions of 
the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, YEE began its expansion 
43  Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, https://ytbweb1 blob core windows 
net/files/resimler/activity_reports/2015-faaliyet-raporu pdf, “Faaliyet Raporu”, 2016, accessed 
in: 23 01 2020  
44  A  N  Yılmaz, G  Kılıçoğlu, op. cit., p  122 
45  H  Tabak, Political Intermediaries and Turkey’s State-to-Society Diplomacy in the Bal-
kans, “Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi”, 2018, no  1 (6), pp  89–90 
46  Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, https://www yee org tr/sites/default/files/2023_vizyonu pdf, 
“2023 Vizyonu”, 2015, accessed in: 24 01 2020 
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outside Turkey’s borders in 2009 when the first centre of the institute was opened 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina47  This is the fact that perfectly explains the crucial 
role of Balkans in the AKP’s foreign policy  Providing a broad catalogue of pro-
grams and projects for multidimensional social and cultural cooperation, Turkish 
cultural centres are currently located in eight Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania 
and Serbia  In some of the above-mentioned states, apart from the main office, 
there are local branches (e g  Sarajevo, Mostar, and Fojnica in Bosnia, Tirana and 
Skhoder in Albania, Bucharest and Constanta in Romania)48  
The activities of the Yunus Emre Institute in the Balkans can be divided into 
two basic sections: education and culture  First and foremost, YEE is a leading 
institution for the teaching of the Turkish language, which, in the views of AKP 
politicians, should achieve in the future the status of global language (taking into 
account the number of users of Turkic languages)  The Yunus Emre Institute’s 
qualified staffs of teachers and lectors conduct language courses for foreigners, 
ending with a Turkish proficiency exam  Furthermore, in collaboration with 
other organizations, the institute organizes cyclical summer schools in Turkey 
during which students learn the language, as well as Turkish culture, history 
and customs49  In this context, one of the most notable YEE’s programs in the 
field of education is the “Turcology Project”  This offers a comprehensive mod-
el for learning the Turkish language  Under this program, scholarships and 
grants are provided, which is a vital incentive to students from the Balkan states  
Among other projects executed in recent years by the Yunus Emre Institute in 
the Balkans, it is worth mentioning programs such as: “Turkish Elective Foreign 
Language”, “Rebuilding the Cultural Heritage in the Balkans”, “Revival of the 
Traditional Turkish Hand Crafts in the Balkans”, “100 Turkey Library Project”, 
“100 Turkey Book Translation Project”, and “Joint Painting Exhibitions”50 
As a result of the activity of the Yunus Emre Institute, the popularity of the 
Turkish language in the Balkans has been constantly growing  This is especially 
evident in the Muslim countries of the region  Here, students have often chosen 
Turkish as their preferred foreign language  According to data published at the 
47  M  Ekşi, AK Parti Döneminde Türkiye’nin Balkanlarda Kamu-Kültürel Diplomasi 
Aracılığıyla Toplumsal-Kültürel Etkinliğini Artırma Politikası, “I  Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler 
Araştırmaları Kongresi”, 2015, no  1, p  722 
48  M  Ekşi, M  S  Erol, The Rise and Fall Of Turkish Soft Power and Public Diplomacy, 
“Akademik Bakış”, 2018, no  11 (23), p  31 
49  Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, https://www yee org tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2017–2018_sta-
ratejik_plan_21 12 2017 pdf, “2017–2018 Stratejik Planı”, 2017, accessed in: 24 01 2020 
50  M  Ekşi, M  S  Erol, op. cit., pp  32–33 
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end of 2019, in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone as many as 20,000 people have 
benefited from the Turkish education system since the establishment of the 
first cultural centre in Sarajevo in 200951  As language is an essential element of 
culture, the indisputable success of YEE's educational programs in the Balkans 
may indicate that at least some nations of the region are gradually adopting 
Turkish patterns 
 At present, it is difficult to predict how the development of Turkish educa-
tional and cultural offer would affect Turkey's relations with the Balkan states  
From the perspective of the AKP politicians, the key challenge will be to attract 
non-Muslim countries to participate more actively in Turkish initiatives52  
Conclusion
As part of this research it has been demonstrated by which methods the 
Turkish authorities have been implementing assumptions of soft power theory 
in their political practice towards the Balkans  Having at its disposal well-or-
ganized and successively expanded institutional structure, the AKP for several 
years has been conducting a great number of diverse projects and programs 
in the field of culture, art, education, architecture, etc  The common motive of 
all these initiatives is the intention to gain more influence in the region, which 
proves the significant positioning of the Balkan Peninsula in the foreign policy 
of the Justice and Development Party  Due to the aforementioned problems of 
Turkish diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa, it is likely that the role 
of the Balkans in AKP regional strategy will grow rapidly in the near future  Plans 
for Turkey's political expansion in the Balkans may be facilitated especially if 
the internal crisis in the European Union persists  Moreover, the lack of a co-
herent strategy regarding EU enlargement in the Western Balkans (e g  failure 
to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in October 
2019) might soon have substantial impact on the geopolitical situation of this 
region53  It cannot be ruled out that the recently observed divisions within the 
51  T  Canbolat, Institute expands Turkish language education in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
“Daily Sabah”, https://www dailysabah com/turkey/2019/12/20/institute-expands-turkish-lan-
guage-education-in-bosnia-herzegovina, 2019, accessed in: 24 01 2020 
52  H  Eşki Uğuz, R  Saygılı, Turkish Public Diplomacy in The Balkans: The Power of Soft 
Power, “Inquiry: Sarajevo Journal of Social Sciences”, 2017, no  1 (3), pp  147–149 
53  B  Huszka, The power of perspective: Why EU membership still matters in the Western 
Balkans, “European Council on Foreign Relations”, https://www ecfr eu/publications/summary/
the_power_of_perspective_why_eu_membership_still_matters_in_western_balkans, 2020, ac-
cessed in: 25 01 2020 
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EU would impede or even temporarily halt the European integration process  
Under such conditions, incorporation of new members into the EU structures 
would not be possible for a long time, which would certainly induce all Balkan 
states to seek cooperation with other relevant actors in the region  Turkey, which 
already has an established position on the Balkan Peninsula, could then take 
this opportunity to expand its sphere of influence by further dimensions (e g  
economic, political, military) 
Referring to the adopted theoretical framework of the image theory, it should 
be noted that Republic of Turkey creates its international image emphasizing the 
cultural and historical ties that connect all regions that were once parts of the 
Ottoman Empire  Turkey’s perception as a powerful actor on the international 
arena, which constantly highlights its imperial past, results from strong martyr-
ological tendencies in Turkish society  Political elites have correctly interpreted 
these moods, hence the AKP's narrative focuses on the idea of building a re-
gional community based on shared values, the source of which is the legacy of 
the Ottoman Empire  As it has been illustrated by the above examples, Turkish 
engagement in recent years has been favourably received by the Balkan states, 
therefore the image of Turkey has been enhanced internationally 
Considering the overall range of AKP actions and initiatives in the Balkans, 
Turkish cultural activities are particularly well perceived  For obvious reasons, 
TİKA, YTB, and YEE projects are addressed predominantly to the Muslim com-
munities of Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, but, nowadays, entire 
Balkan states have been increasingly benefiting from cultural support programs 
implemented by Turkey54  Learning from past experiences, the Turks have already 
become aware that presenting the Ottoman past as so-called "peninsular golden 
age" had been a mistake, since the vast majority of Balkan states recognize the 
centuries of sultans’ rule as a time of slavery and persecution  Fortunately, the 
AKP withdrew relatively quickly from its controversial rhetoric that indeed could 
have been considered as a manifestation of imperialism  The change in Turkish 
approach is evidenced by the aforementioned reconstruction of Christian mon-
uments, which builds trust between Turkey and non-Muslim countries55 
This research proves that the basic goal of President Erdoğan and the Justice 
and Development Party is simply to preserve historical heritage from the Otto-
man period for future generations  In addition, Turkey's cultural efforts in the 
Balkans have also a very practical aspect, i e  development of tourism, which is 
an essential economic sector for all Balkan countries  Ultimately, there should 
54  A  N  Yılmaz, G  Kılıçoğlu, op. cit., pp  123–125 
55  Y  Avcı, op. cit., pp  121–122 
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be no doubt that the legacy of the region needs urgent renovation  In such 
circumstances, an actual source of funding for extensive conservation works 
falls into the background  After years of fruitful collaboration, during which 
hundreds of monuments have been renovated, Balkan state authorities appear 
to be no longer afraid of initiatives promoted by the Turkish Coordination and 
Cooperation Agency – provided their scope is limited to the cultural dimen-
sion56  Similarly, educational and social support offered by the Presidency for 
Turks Abroad and Related Communities and Yunus Emre Institute has been 
helping the Balkan countries to undergo systemic transformation and to imple-
ment necessary internal reforms  At the same time, Turkey’s engagement in the 
Balkans plays an extremely significant role in domestic policy  By cultivating the 
Ottoman legacy of the region, the AKP demonstrates to Turkish citizens that 
the Republic of Turkey, as an important actor in the international arena, cares 
for its imperial past57 
According to critics of Turkey’s presence in the Balkans, the real intention of 
the Justice and Development Party is an islamization of the region, as the basic 
form of TİKA's activity is renovation of mosques  Other opponents of Ankara's 
growing influence within the boundaries of former Ottoman Empire claim that 
the AKP's regional involvement is aimed at radicalizing Muslim communities 
and then harnessing tensions in the Balkan Peninsula to pursue its own political 
goals58  So far none of these critical opinions have been confirmed  Represent-
atives of Turkish diplomacy categorically and unequivocally deny these kinds 
of accusations, emphasizing the multifaceted support provided to all Balkan 
communities, and not only to religiously related ones  In addition, recent es-
timates show that the level of Muslim radicalism in the Balkans is slowly but 
steadily decreasing59 
It would seem that the AKP politicians understand that in competition 
with the EU, USA, and Russia, the Republic of Turkey has no great chance to 
expand its political influence throughout the entire Balkan Peninsula  The de-
gree of Turkish potential in the region is still insufficient, since renovation and 
educational projects alone will not allow Ankara to achieve international power 
56  Z  Weise, Turkey’s Balkan comeback, “Politico”, https://www politico eu/article/turkey-west-
ern-balkans-comeback-european-union-recep-tayyip-erdogan/,2018, accessed in: 22 01 2020
57  E  Efegil, AK Parti Hükümetinin Orta Doğu Politikası ve ABD Yönetimi ile Batılı Uzman-
ların Eleştirileri, “Akademik Bakış”, 2017, no  9 (18), pp  53–55 
58  J  Bugajski, Is Turkey Destabilizing Balkans?, “CEPA Europe’s Edge”, 2018, accessed in: 
22 01 2020 
59  D  Gibas-Krzak, Terrorism in the Balkans. Genesis – types – prognoses, “Internal Security 
Review”, 2018, no  10 (19), pp  332–333 
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status60  Despite the aforementioned remarks, Turkish cultural initiatives in the 
Balkans must be considered a success, as among all manifestations of Turkish 
soft power in neighboring regions, the Ottoman heritage restoration program 
has brought the most benefits to the Turks  An extremely important element 
of the strategy of renovating Turkish heritage in the Balkans is the possibility of 
transmitting an intangible asset (culture) into a material effect (architecture)  
Thus, old Ottoman monuments renewed by TİKA gain much greater significance 
in local awareness than ordinary buildings  This peculiar reification of power may 
contribute to Turkey’s actual retrieval of lasting influence in the Balkan countries 
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Odzyskując wpływy: tureckie inicjatywy współpracy kulturowej na Bałkanach
Streszczenie: Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ocena efektywności podejmowanych przez tureckie 
władze w XXI wieku działań, które miały skutkować wzmocnieniem wieloaspektowej współpracy 
z państwami bałkańskimi  Odkąd Partia Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju przejęła rządy w 2002 roku, 
jednym z głównych zadań jej polityki zagranicznej była próba odzyskania wpływów na terenie 
dawnego Imperium Osmańskiego  Położenie geograficzne, dziedzictwo historyczne oraz bogactwo 
kulturowe Turcji stwarzały dogodne warunki do takiej ekspansji politycznej  W procesie promocji 
Republiki Turcji wśród sąsiednich państw zaangażowane są wyspecjalizowane instytucje i agencje 
(np  Turecka Agencja Współpracy i Koordynacji, Prezydencja dla Turków Za Granicą oraz Po-
krewnych Społeczności, Instytut Yunusa Emre)  Analiza wybranych działań wymienionych wyżej 
organizacji stanowi kluczowy element pracy  
Słowa kluczowe: Republika Turcji, państwa bałkańskie, Partia Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju, ini-
cjatywy współpracy regionalnej
